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Abstract. A Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption
(CP-ABPRE) employs the PRE technology in the attribute-based encryption cryptographic setting, in which the proxy is allowed to convert
an encryption under an access policy to another encryption under a new
access policy. CP-ABPRE is applicable to many real world applications,
such as network data sharing. The existing CP-ABPRE systems, however, leave how to achieve adaptive CCA security as an interesting open
problem. This paper, for the first time, proposes a new CP-ABPRE to
tackle the problem by integrating the dual system encryption technology
with selective proof technique. The new scheme supports any monotonic
access structures. Although our scheme is built in the composite order
bilinear group, it is proven adaptively CCA secure in the standard model
without jeopardizing the expressiveness of access policy.
Keywords: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption, CiphertextPolicy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption, Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext
Security.
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Introduction

Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [10,21], which is a generalization of
Public Key Encryption (PKE), provides flexibility of data sharing for
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system users such that a data encryptor is allowed to specify some descriptive values x for an encryption and thus, the encryption can be decrypted successfully by a secret key associated with some descriptive values y matching x. ABE has many applications, such as audit log applications [10]. It usually has two classifications: Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE)
and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE). In a KP-ABE system, ciphertexts
are associated with attribute sets and secret keys are associated with access policies. However, CP-ABE is complementary. This paper deals with
the case of CP-ABE.
In a cloud storage system, a user, say Alice, may encrypt a data under
a specified access policy such that other system users satisfying this policy
can access the data. She might encrypt her profile under a policy AP1 =
(“Department : Human Resource” and “P osition : T eam manager or
above”) before uploading to the cloud. The system users satisfying AP1
then can download the ciphertext from the cloud, and next access the
data by using the corresponding secret keys. This data sharing pattern,
nonetheless, does not scale well when the policy needs to be updated frequently. Suppose the policy above is updated as AP2 = (“Department :
Human Resource or M aterials Storage” and “P osition : T eam manager
only”), Alice then should generate a new encryption accordingly. If Alice
does not back up the data locally, she needs to download the ciphertext so
as to recovers the data first. If the access policy is updated N times, Alice needs to construct N new encryptions. This might not be desirable as
Alice’s workload is linearly in N . Besides, if she is off-line or using some
resource-limited devices which cannot afford such heavy computational
cost, the data sharing might not be handled effectively.
To efficiently share data, we may leverage Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE).
PRE is introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [19], and further studied by
Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [5]. It is an interesting extension of PKE providing the delegation of decryption rights. Specifically, it allows a semitrusted proxy to transform a ciphertext intended for Alice into another
ciphertext of the same plaintext intended for another system user, say
Bob, without revealing knowledge of the secret keys and the underlying
plaintext. It is applicable to many network applications, such as secure
distributed files systems [1] and email forwarding [5].
To integrate PRE in the ABE cryptographic setting, Liang et al. [16]
defined Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based PRE (CP-ABPRE), and proposed a concrete CP-ABPRE system enabling proxy to transform an encryption under a specified access policy into another encryption under a
new access policy. We refer to this special functionality as attribute-based
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re-encryption. By using the technology of CP-ABPRE, Alice can share
the data more efficiently. She first generates a re-encryption key from her
own attribute set to a new access policy AP2 , and next uploads the key to
the cloud such that the cloud server then can convert the original encryption under AP1 to a new encryption under AP2 . The server, nevertheless,
cannot learn the data during the conversion of cipehrtexts.
Although CP-ABPRE explores the applications of PRE, they leave
us interesting open problems. All the existing CP-ABPRE schemes in
the literature are secure against selective chosen-plaintext attacks (selective CPA) only except [15] which is selective chosen-ciphertext attacks
(selective CCA) secure. We state that CPA security might not be sufficient enough in an open network as it only guarantees the secrecy of data
which only allows an encryption to be secure against “static” adversaries.
Nevertheless, in a real network scenario, there might exist “active” adversaries trying to tamper an encryption in transit and next observing
its decryption so as to obtain useful information related to the underlying data. Accordingly, a CP-ABPRE system being secure against CCA
is needed as CCA security not only helps the system preclude the above
subtle attacks but also enables the system to be further developed and
next securely “embedded” to a large protocol/system implementing in
arbitrary network environments. In addition, a CP-ABPRE system with
selective security, which limits an adversary to choose an attack target
before playing security game, might not scale in practice as well. This
is so because a realistic adversary can adaptively choose his attack target upon attacking a cryptosystem. Therefore, an adaptively CCA secure
CP-ABPRE scheme is needed in most of practical network applications.
The expressiveness of access policy is another crucial factor for a practical CP-ABPRE system. An access policy should be embedded with
AN D, OR gates, and even more meaningful expression. For instance,
Alice might choose to share her profile with some officials of the same company under the access policy AP3 = (“Department : allexcept Human
Resource” and “P osition : P roject head or team manager”). Nevertheless, most of the existing CP-ABPRE schemes only support access
policy with AN D gates operating over attributes. This limits their practical use. Thus it is desirable to propose a CP-ABPRE system supporting
more expressive access policy.
1.1

Our Contributions

This work first formalizes the notion of adaptive CCA security for CPABPRE systems. Compared to the selective CPA security notion, our new
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notion enables an adversary to commit to a target access policy in the
challenge phase, and to gain access to re-encryption and decryption oracles additionally. To tackle the open problems mentioned previously, this
paper proposes a novel single-hop unidirectional CP-ABPRE system. In
addition, the new system supports any monotonic access policy such that
system users are allowed to fulfill more flexible delegation of decryption
rights. Despite our scheme is built in the composite order bilinear group,
it is proven adaptively CCA secure in the standard model by integrating
the dual system encryption technology with the selective proof technique.
1.2

Related Work

Below we review some ABE systems related to this work. Following the
introduction of ABE due to Sahai and Waters [21], Goyal et al. [10] proposed the first KP-ABE system. Later, Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [4]
defined a complementary notion, i.e. CP-ABE. After that there are some
CP-ABE schemes (e.g. [7,9,22,2]) that have been proposed. Recently, Waters [23] proposed a deterministic finite automata-based functional encryption where policy is expressed by arbitrary-size regular language.
The aforementioned schemes, nonetheless, are only selective secure
(except for [4] being proven in the generic group model). To convert one
of the CP-ABE systems [22] to achieve fully security, Lewko et al. [13]
leveraged the dual system encryption technology. But their conversion
yields some loss of expressiveness. Later, Lewko and Waters [14] introduced a new method to guarantee the expressiveness by employing the
selective proof technique into the dual system encryption technology. Inspired by [14,22], this paper focuses on constructing the first CP-ABPRE
with adaptive CCA security in the standard model.
Decryption rights delegation is introduced in [19]. Later, Blaze, Bleumer
and Strauss [5] defined PRE. PRE can be classified as: unidirectional and
bidirectional PRE, and single-hop and multi-hop PRE [1]. This present
work deals with the single-hop unidirectional case. Since its introduction
many PRE systems have been proposed, e.g., [1,6,12,17,11,24,25,26].
To employ PRE in the context of ABE, Liang et al. [16] defined CPABPRE, and further extended [7] to support proxy re-encryption. Their
work provides AN D gates over positive and negative attributes. Luo et
al. [18] proposed an extension of [16] supporting policy with AN D gates
on multi-valued and negative attributes. To combine ABE with IBE by
using PRE technique, Mizuno and Doi [20] proposed a special type of CPABPRE scheme where encryptions in the form of ABE can be converted
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to the ones being decrypted in the context of IBE. The previously introduced systems, however, are selectively CPA secure, and their policies are
lack of expressiveness due to supporting AN D gates over attributes only.
Thus an adaptively CCA-secure CP-ABPRE scheme with more expressive access policy remains open. This paper deals with this problem.
Below we compare this work with some CP-ABPRE schemes. We let
p be the number of attributes used in an access policy, a be the number
of attributes embedded in a user’s secret key and u be the total number
of attributes used in the system. In the worst case, an access policy and
a user’s secret key might be embedded with all system attributes, that
is p = a = u. Thus we have p, a ≤ u. We use ce and cp to denote the
computational cost of an exponentiation and a bilinear pairing. To the
best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first to achieve adaptive CCA
security, and to support any monotonic access formula.
Table 1. Comparison with [16,18,20]

Schemes Public/Secret Ciphertext
Key Size
Size

Re-Encryption
Cost

O(u)/O(u)
O(u2 )/O(u)
O(u)/O(u)
O(u)/O(a)

O(u) · cp
O(u) · cp
O(1) · ce + O(u) · cp
O(a) · ce + O(a) · cp

[16]
[18]
[20]
Ours

2

O(u)
O(u)
O(u)
O(p)

Adaptive CCA
Security Security

#
#
#
!

#
#
#
!

Definitions and Security Models

We review the definition of CP-ABPRE systems, and next define the
adaptive CCA security notion. Due to limited space we refer the reader
to [22] for the details of access structure and Linear Secret Sharing Schemes.
2.1

Definition of CP-ABPRE

We review the definition of single-hop unidirectional CP-ABPRE [16,18].
Definition 1. A Single-Hop Unidirectional Ciphertext-Policy AttributeBased Proxy Re-Encryption (CP-ABPRE) scheme consists of the following algorithms:
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1. (param, msk) ← Setup(1k , U): on input a security parameter k ∈ N
and an attribute universe U, output the public parameters param and
a master secret key msk.
2. skS ← KeyGen(param, msk, S): on input param, msk and an attribute set S describing the key, output a secret key skS for S.
3. rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) ← ReKeyGen(param, skS , (A0 , ρ0 )): on input param, skS ,
and an access structure (A0 , ρ0 ) for attributes over U, output a reencryption key rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) which can be used to transform a ciphertext
under (A, ρ) to another ciphertext under (A0 , ρ0 ), where S |= (A, ρ),
S 2 (A0 , ρ0 ), (A, ρ) and (A0 , ρ0 ) are two disjoint access structures. Note
by two disjoint access structures we mean for any attribute x satisfies
(A, ρ), x does not satisfy (A0 , ρ0 ).
4. C ← Encrypt(param, (A, ρ), m): on input param, (A, ρ), and a message m ∈ {0, 1}k , output an original ciphertext C which can be further
re-encrypted. Note (A, ρ) is implicitly included in the ciphertext.
5. CR ← ReEnc(param, rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) , C): on input param, rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) ,
and a C under (A, ρ), output a re-encrypted ciphertext CR under
(A0 , ρ0 ) if S |= (A, ρ) or a symbol ⊥ indicating either C is invalid
or S 2 (A, ρ). Note CR cannot be further re-encrypted.
6. m ← Dec(param, skS , C): on input param, skS , and a C under
(A, ρ), output a message m if S |= (A, ρ) or a symbol ⊥ indicating
either C is invalid or S 2 (A, ρ).
7. m ← DecR (param, skS , CR ): on input param, skS , and a CR under
(A, ρ), output a message m if S |= (A, ρ) or a symbol ⊥ indicating
either CR is invalid or S 2 (M, ρ).
2.2

Security Models

Definition 2. A single-hop unidirectional CP-ABPRE scheme is INDCCA secure at original ciphertext if no Probabilistic Polynomial Time
(PPT) adversary A can win the game below with non-negligible advantage.
Below C is the game challenger.
1. Setup. C runs Setup(1k , U) and sends param to A.
2. Phase 1.
(a) Secret key extraction oracle Osk (S): on input an attribute set S,
C runs skS ← KeyGen(param, msk, S) and returns skS to A.
(b) Re-encryption key extraction oracle Ork (S, (A0 , ρ0 )): on input S,
and an access structure (A0 , ρ0 ), C outputs rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) ← ReKeyGen
(param, skS , (A0 , ρ0 )), where skS ← KeyGen(param, msk, S).
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(c) Re-encryption oracle Ore (S, (A0 , ρ0 ), C): on input S, (A0 , ρ0 ), an
original ciphertext C under (A, ρ), C outputs CR ← ReEnc(param,
rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) , C), where rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) ← ReKeyGen(param, skS , (A0 ,
ρ0 )), skS ← KeyGen(param, msk, S) and S |= (A, ρ).
(d) Original ciphertext decryption oracle Odec (S, C): on input S and a
C under (A, ρ), C returns m ← Dec(param, skS , C) to A, where
skS ← KeyGen(param, msk, S) and S |= (A, ρ).
(e) Re-encrypted ciphertext decryption oracle OdecR (S, CR ): on input
S and a CR under (A, ρ), C returns m ← DecR (param, skS , CR ),
where skS ← KeyGen(param, msk, S) and S |= (A, ρ).
If ciphertexts issued to Ore , Odec and OdecR are invalid, outputs ⊥.
3. Challenge. A outputs two equal length messages m0 and m1 , and a
challenge access structure (A∗ , ρ∗ ) to C. If the following queries
Osk (S) for any S |= (A∗ , ρ∗ ); and
Ork (S, (A0 , ρ0 )) for any S |= (A∗ , ρ∗ ), Osk (S 0 ) for any S 0 |= (A0 , ρ0 )
are never made, C returns C ∗ = Encrypt(param, (A∗ , ρ∗ ), mb ) to A,
where b ∈R {0, 1}.
4. Phase 2. A continues making queries except the followings:
(a) Osk (S) for any S |= (A∗ , ρ∗ );
(b) Ork (S, (A0 , ρ0 )) for any S |= (A∗ , ρ∗ ), and Osk (S 0 ) for any S 0 |=
(A0 , ρ0 );
(c) Ore (S, (A0 , ρ0 ), C ∗ ) for any S |= (A∗ , ρ∗ ), and Osk (S 0 ) for any S 0 |=
(A0 , ρ0 );
(d) Odec (S, C ∗ ) for any S |= (A∗ , ρ∗ ); and
(e) OdecR (S, CR ) for any CR under (A, ρ), S |= (A, ρ), where CR is a
derivative of C ∗ . As of [6], the derivative of C ∗ is defined as:
i. C ∗ is a derivative of itself.
ii. If A has issued a re-encryption key query on (S ∗ , (A0 , ρ0 )) to
get rkS ∗ →(A0 ,ρ0 ) , obtained CR ← ReEnc(param, rkS ∗ →(A0 ,ρ0 ) ,
C ∗ ) such that DecR (param, skS 0 , CR ) ∈ {m0 , m1 }, then CR is
a derivative of C ∗ , where S ∗ |= (A∗ , ρ∗ ) and S 0 |= (A0 , ρ0 ).
iii. If A has issued a re-encryption query on (S, (A0 , ρ0 ), C ∗ ) and
obtained the re-encrypted ciphertext CR , then CR is a derivative of C ∗ , where S |= (A∗ , ρ∗ ).
5. Guess. A outputs a guess bit b0 ∈ {0, 1}. If b0 = b, A wins.
IN D-CCA-Or (1k , U) = |P r[b0 = b] − 1 |.
A’s advantage is defined as AdvCP
-ABP RE,A
2

Definition 3. A single-hop unidirectional CP-ABPRE scheme is INDIN D-CCA-Re (1k ,
CCA secure at re-encrypted ciphertext if the advantage AdvCP
-ABP RE,A
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U) is negligible for any PPT adversary A in the following experiment. Set
O = {Osk , Ork , Odec , OdecR }.
IN D-CCA-Re
k
0
k
AdvCP
-ABP RE,A (1 , U) = |P r[b = b : (param, msk) ← Setup(1 , U);

(m0 , m1 , (A∗ , ρ∗ ), (A, ρ)) ← AO (param); b ∈R {0, 1};
1
∗
∗
CR
← ReEnc(param, rkS→(A∗ ,ρ∗ ) , C); b0 ← AO (CR
)] − |,
2
where (A, ρ) and (A∗ , ρ∗ ) are disjoint, (A∗ , ρ∗ ) is the challenge access
structure, S |= (A, ρ), rkS→(A∗ ,ρ∗ ) ← ReKeyGen(param, skS , (A∗ , ρ∗ )),
C ← Encrypt(param, (A, ρ), mb ), Osk , Ork , Odec , OdecR are the oracles
defined in Definition 2. However, these oracles are restricted by the following constraints. For Osk , any query S |= (A∗ , ρ∗ ) is rejected. There is
no restriction to Ork and Odec (note invalid ciphertexts issued to Odec are
∗ ) in which S |= (A∗ , ρ∗ )
rejected). If A queries to OdecR on either (S, CR
or any invalid re-encrypted ciphertext, the oracle outputs ⊥.
Remarks. Definition 3 implies collusion resistance. If A can compromise
skS ∗ from either rkS ∗ →(A,ρ) or rkS→(A∗ ,ρ∗ ) , A wins the game with nonnegligible probability, where S |= (A, ρ), S ∗ |= (A∗ , ρ∗ ) and skS is given.

3
3.1

An Adaptively CCA-Secure CP-ABPRE
Construction

Due to limited space we review composite order bilinear groups, complexity assumptions, and one-time symmetric encryption in Appendix A.
1. Setup(1k , U). Run (N, G, GT , e) ← G(1k ), where N = p1 p2 p3 is the
order of group G and p1 , p2 , p3 are distinct primes. Let Gpi denote the
subgroup of order pi in group G. Choose a, α, κ, β,  ∈R ZN , g, ĝ1 ∈R
Gp1 , two Target Collision Resistance hash functions [8] T CR1 : GT →
k
ZN , T CR2 : GT → {0, 1}poly(1 ) , a CCA-secure one-time symmetric
encryption system SY M and a strongly existential unforgeable onetime signature system [3] OT S. For each attribute i ∈ U, choose
hi ∈R ZN . The param is (N, g, ĝ1 , g a , g κ , g β , g  , e(g, g)α , ∀i ∈ U Hi =
g hi , T CR1 , T CR2 , SY M, OT S), and the msk is (g α , g3 ), where g3 is
a generator of Gp3 .
2. KeyGen(param, msk, S). Choose t, u ∈R ZN , R, R0 , R00 , {Ri }i∈S ∈R
Gp3 , and set the secret key skS as
(S, K = g α g at g κu R, K 0 = g u R0 , K 00 = g t R00 , ∀i ∈ S Ki = Hit Ri ).
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3. Encrypt(param, (A, ρ), m). Given an LSSS access structure (A, ρ)
and a message m ∈ GT in which A is an l × n matrix and ρ is a map
from each row Aj to an attribute ρ(j),
(a) Choose a random vector v = (s, v2 , ..., vn ) ∈R ZnN .
(b) For each Aj , choose rj ∈R ZN , run (ssk, svk) ← OT S.KeyGen(1k )
and set
B0 = m · e(g, g)αs , B1 = g s , B2 = (g κ )s , B3 = (ĝ1svk g β )s , B4 = (g  )s ,
∀j ∈ [1, l](Cj = (g a )Aj v Hρ(j) −rj , Dj = g rj ),
E = OT S.Sign(ssk, (B0 , B1 , B3 , ∀j ∈ [1, l] (Cj , Dj ))).
(c) Output C = (svk, B0 , B1 , B2 , B3 , B4 , ∀j ∈ [1, l] (Cj , Dj ), E).
Note {ρ(j)|1 ≤ j ≤ l} are the attributes used in (A, ρ).
4. ReKeyGen(param, skS , (A0 , ρ0 )). Given skS = (S, K, K 0 , K 00 , ∀i ∈
S Ki ) and an LSSS access structure (A0 , ρ0 ),
(a) Choose θ1 , θ2 , θ3 ∈R ZN , δ ∈R GT , set rk1 = (Kg κθ1 g aθ2 )T CR1 (δ) g θ3 ,
rk2 = (K 0 g θ1 )T CR1 (δ) , rk3 = (K 00 g θ2 )T CR1 (δ) , rk4 = g θ3 , ∀i ∈ S
rk5,i = (Ki Hiθ2 )T CR1 (δ) .
(rk)
(rk)
(b) Choose a random vector v (rk) = (s(rk) , v2 , ..., vn ) ∈R ZnN . For
(rk)
each row A0j of A0 , choose rj
∈R ZN , run (ssk (rk) , svk (rk) ) ←
OT S.KeyGen(1k ) and set rk6 as
(rk)

svk (rk) , B0
(rk)

B3

(rk)

Dj

= δ · e(g, g)αs

svk(rk)

= (ĝ1
=g

∀j ∈ [1, l]

(rk)
rj

s(rk)

gβ )

(rk)

(rk)

, B1

= gs
(rk)

, ∀j ∈ [1, l] (Cj

(rk)

(rk)

, B2

= (g a )

A0j v (rk)

(rk)

), E (rk) = OT S.Sign(ssk (rk) , (B0

= (g κ )s

Hρ0 (j)

(rk)

, B1

(rk)

(rk)

, B3

,

(rk)
−rj

,

,

(rk)
(rk)
(Cj , Dj ))).

(c) Output rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) = (rk1 , rk2 , rk3 , rk4 , ∀i ∈ S rk5,i , rk6 ).
5. ReEnc(param, rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) , C). Parse the original ciphertext C under
(A, ρ) as (svk, B0 , B1 , B2 , B3 , B4 , ∀j ∈ [1, l] (Cj , Dj ), E), and the
re-encryption key rkS→(A0 ,ρ0 ) as (rk1 , rk2 , rk3 , rk4 , ∀i ∈ S rk5,i , rk6 ).
(a) Check the validity of the original ciphertext C as
?

?

?

e(B1 , g κ ) = e(B2 , g), e(B1 , ĝ1svk g β ) = e(B3 , g), e(B1 , g  ) = e(B4 , g),
Y
Y
?
?
w
wj
e(
Cj j , g) = e(B1 , g a ) ·
(e(Dj−1 , Hρ(j)
)), S |= (A, ρ),
ρ(j)∈S

ρ(j)∈S
?

OT S.V erif y(svk, (E, (B0 , B1 , B3 , ∀j ∈ [1, l] (Cj , Dj )))) = 1, (1)
P
where wj are chosen by the proxy so that ρ(j)∈S wj Aj = (1, 0,
..., 0). If Eq. (1) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
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(b) Compute F =

−1
−1
e(B
Q 1 ,rk1 )e(B2 ,rk2 ) e(B4 ,rk4 )
,
( ρ(j)∈S (e(Cj ,rk3 )e(Dj ,rk5,j ))wj )

run σ1 = SY M.Enc(

T CR2 (key), G), where G = (C||rk6 ||F ) and key ∈R GT .
(re)
(re)
(c) Choose a random vector v (re) = (s(re) , v2 , ..., vn ) ∈R ZnN . For
(re)
each row A0j of A0 , choose rj
∈R ZN , run (ssk (re) , svk (re) ) ←
OT S.KeyGen(1k ) and set σ2 as
(re)

svk (re) , B0
(re)

B3

(re)

Dj

(re)

= key · e(g, g)αs

svk(re)

= (ĝ1
=g

∀j ∈ [1, l]

(re)
rj

s(re)

gβ )

(re)

, B1

(re)

= gs

(re)

, ∀j ∈ [1, l] (Cj

(re)

, B2

= (g a )

A0j v (re)

(re)

), E (re) = OT S.Sign(ssk (re) , (B0

(re)

= (g κ )s
Hρ0 (j)

(re)

, B1

(re)

, B3

,

(re)
−rj

,

,

(re)
(re)
(Cj , Dj ))).

(d) Output CR = (σ1 , σ2 ) under (A0 , ρ0 ).
6. Dec(param, skS , C). Parse the original ciphertext C under (A, ρ) as
(svk, B0 , B1 , B2 , B3 , B4 , ∀j ∈ [1, l] (Cj , Dj ), E), and the secret key
skS as (S, K, K 0 , K 00 , ∀i ∈ S Ki ). TheP
decryption algorithm chooses a
set of constants wj ∈R ZN such that ρ(j)∈S wj Aj = (1, 0, ..., 0), and
next recovers the message as follows.
(a) If Eq. (1) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
Q
(b) Compute e(B1 , K)e(B2 , K 0 )−1 /( ρ(j)∈S (e(Cj , K 00 )e(Dj , Kρ(j) ))wj )
= e(g, g)αs , and output the message m = B0 /e(g, g)αs .
7. DecR (param, skS , CR ). Parse the re-encrypted ciphertext CR under
(A0 , ρ0 ) as (σ1 , σ2 ), and the secret key skS as (S, K, K 0 , K 00 , ∀i ∈ S Ki ).
(a) Check the validity of σ2 as
?

(re)

(re)

?

(re)

(re)

(re)

e(B1 , g κ ) = e(B2 , g), e(B1 , ĝ1svk g β ) = e(B3 , g),
(re)
Y
Y
w
?
(re) (re)
(re)
(re)
e(
(Cj )wj , g) = e(B1 , g a ) ·
(e((Dj )−1 , Hρ0 j(j) )),
ρ0 (j)∈S

ρ0 (j)∈S
(re)

OT S.V erif y(svk (re) , (E (re) , (B0
(re)

∀j ∈ [1, l] (Cj

(re)

, Dj

?

(re)

, B1

(re)

, B3

,

?

)))) = 1, S |= (A0 , ρ0 ),

(2)

P
(re)
(re)
where wj are chosen by the decryptor so that ρ0 (j)∈S wj A0j =
(1, 0, ..., 0). If Eq. (2) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
Q
(re)
(re)
(re)
(re)
(b) Compute e(B1 , K)e(B2 , K 0 )−1 /( ρ0 (j)∈S (e(Cj , K 00 )e(Dj ,
(re)

(re)

(re)

Kρ0 (j) ))wj ) = e(g, g)αs , and output key = B0
(c) Run G = SY M.Dec(T CR2 (key), σ1 ).

/e(g, g)αs

(re)

.
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(d) Parse G as (C, rk6 , F ). If either Eq. (1) or the following verification
for rk6 does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
?

(rk)

(rk)

(rk)

(rk)

?

(rk)

e(B1 , g κ ) = e(B2 , g), e(B1 , ĝ1svk g β ) = e(B3 , g),
(rk)
Y
Y
w
?
(rk)
(rk) (rk)
(rk)
(e((Dj )−1 , Hρ0 j(j) )),
(Cj )wj , g) = e(B1 , g a ) ·
e(
ρ0 (j)∈S

ρ0 (j)∈S

(rk)
(rk)
(rk)
OT S.V erif y(svk (rk) , (E (rk) , (B0 , B1 , B3 ,
?
?
(rk)
(rk)
∀j ∈ [1, l] (Cj , Dj )))) = 1, S |= (A0 , ρ0 ),

(3)

P
(rk)
(rk)
where wj are chosen by the decryptor so that ρ0 (j)∈S wj A0j =
(1, 0, ..., 0).
Q
(rk)
(rk)
(rk)
(rk)
(e) Compute e(B1 , K)e(B2 , K 0 )−1 /( ρ0 (j)∈S (e(Cj , K 00 )e(Dj ,
(rk)

(rk)

(rk)

(rk)

Kρ0 (j) ))wj ) = e(g, g)αs , and then B0 /e(g, g)αs
= δ. Com−1
T
CR
(δ)
αs
1
pute F
= e(g, g) , and finally output m = B0 /e(g, g)αs .
3.2

Security Analysis

Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1, the general subgroup decision assumption, the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption in a subgroup, and
the source q-parallel BDHE assumption in a subgroup hold, SY M is a
CCA-secure one-time symmetric encryption, OT S is a strongly existential unforgeable one-time signature, and T CR1 , T CR2 are the TCR hash
functions, our system is IND-CCA secure in the standard model.
We prove our scheme by following [14]. Due to limited space, we present
our construction for semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys
in the full version.
We will prove Theorem 1 in a hybrid argument over a sequence of
games. We let the total number of queries be q = qsk + qrk + qre + qdec ,
where qsk , qrk , qre , qdec denote the number of the secret key, re-encryption
key, re-encryption and decryption queries, respectively. Gamereal is the
first game that is the IND-CCA security game for CP-ABPRE systems in
which the challenge ciphertext (original ciphertext/re-encrypted ciphertext) is normal. Here, C will use normal secret keys to respond secret key
extraction queries. Besides, C will first generate normal secret keys, and
next leverage these keys to respond the re-encryption key, re-encryption
and decryption queries, namely, the re-encryption keys, re-encryption results and decryption results are indirectly computed from the normal
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secret keys. Game0 is the second game which is identical to Gamereal
except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
Hereafter by “keys” (resp. “key”) we mean the secret key(s) (constructed by C) used to respond the secret key extraction, re-encryption
key extraction, re-encryption and decryption queries. In the following, we
will convert the “keys” to be semi-functional one by one. But for clarity we
first turn the “keys” for the secret key extraction queries, and then convert the “keys” for the re-encryption key queries, the re-encryption queries
and the decryption queries in sequence. Besides, A issues one query in
each of the following games. We define Gamei as follows, where i ∈ [1, q].
We let jτ ∈ [1, qτ ], where τ ∈ {sk, rk, re, dec}. In Gamejτ we define two
T
sub-games GameN
jτ and Gamejτ in which the challenge ciphertext is semifunctional. In GameN
jτ the first (j − 1)τ “keys” are semi-functional, the
jτ -th “key” is nominal semi-functional, and the rest of “keys” are normal.
In GameTjτ the first (j − 1)τ “keys” are semi-functional, the jτ -th “key”
is temporary semi-functional, and the remaining “keys” are normal.
To transform Game(j−1)τ (where jτ -th “key” is normal) to Gamejτ
(where jτ -th “key” is semi-functional) , we first convert Game(j−1)τ to
T
N
GameN
jτ , then to Gamejτ , and finally to Gamejτ . To get from Gamejτ to
T
Gamejτ , we treat the simulations for the queries of Phase 1 and that of
Phase 2 differently: the former is based on the three party Diffie-Hellman
assumption, and the latter is based on the source group q-parallel BDHE
assumption. In Gameq = Gameqdec all “keys” are semi-functional, and
the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional for one of the given messages.
Gamef inal is the final game where all “keys” are semi-functional and the
challenge ciphertext is semi-functional for a random message, independent
of the two message given by A. We will prove the above games to be
indistinguishable by the following lemmas. Note we implicitly assume
SY M is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric encryption, OT S is a strongly
existential unforgeable one-time signature, T CR1 , T CR2 are TCR hash
functions and it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N (for Lemma 3
and Lemma 4).
CP -ABP RE −
Lemma 1. If there is an algorithm A such that Gamereal AdvA
CP
ABP
RE
Game0 AdvA
= ϕ, we build an algorithm C that breaks the general subgroup decision assumption with advantage ϕ.
CP -ABP RE
Lemma 2. If there is an algorithm A such that Game(j−1)τ AdvA
CP -ABP RE = ϕ (for any j ∈ [1, q ]), we build an algorithm
− GameN
τ
τ
jτ AdvA
C that breaks the general subgroup decision assumption with advantage ϕ.
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CP -ABP RE
Lemma 3. If there is an algorithm A such that GameN
jτ AdvA
CP -ABP RE = ϕ for a j belonging to the Phase 1 queries,
− GameTjτ AdvA
τ
we build an algorithm C that breaks the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption in a subgroup with advantage ϕ.
CP -ABP RE
Lemma 4. If there is an algorithm A such that GameN
jτ AdvA
CP -ABP RE = ϕ for a j belonging to the Phase 2 queries,
− GameTjτ AdvA
τ
we build an algorithm C that breaks the source group q-parallel BDHE
assumption in a subgroup with advantage ϕ.
CP -ABP RE
Lemma 5. If there is an algorithm A such that GameTjτ AdvA
CP
ABP
RE
− Gamejτ AdvA
= ϕ (for any jτ ∈ [1, qτ ]), we build an algorithm
C that breaks the general subgroup decision assumption with advantage ϕ.
CP -ABP RE
Lemma 6. If there is an algorithm A such that Gameq AdvA
CP
ABP
RE
= ϕ, we can build a reduction algorithm C
− Gamef inal AdvA
that breaks Assumption 1 with advantage ϕ.

Due to limited space, we will provide the proofs of the lemmas in the full
version of this paper.

4

Conclusions

This paper defined the IND-CCA security notion for CP-ABPRE systems,
and proposed the first adaptively CCA-secure CP-ABPRE scheme without loss of expressiveness on access policy by integrating the dual system
encryption technology with selective proof technique. Following the proof
framework introduced by Lewko and Waters, our scheme was proved in
the standard model. This paper also motivates interesting open problems,
such as, converting our system in the prime order bilinear group.
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A

Preliminaries

Due to limited space, we refer the reader to [14] for the definition of composite order bilinear groups, assumption 1, the general subgroup decision
assumption, the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption in a subgroup, the
source group q-parallel BDHE assumption in a subgroup. We here review
the one-time symmetric encryption system.
One-time Symmetric Encryption. A one-time symmetric encryption [8] consists of the following algorithms. Note let KD be the key
k
space {0, 1}poly(1 ) , and SY M be a symmetric encryption scheme, where
poly(1k ) is the fixed polynomial size (bound) with respect to the security
parameter k. The encryption algorithm SY M.Enc intakes a key K ∈ KD
and a message M , outputs a ciphertext C. The decryption algorithm
SY M.Dec intakes K and C, outputs M or a symbol ⊥. The CCA security model for SY M systems is given in [12], we hence omit the details.

